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INTRODUCTIOH 
New Zealand has enjoyed the right of appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council since 1841.(1) 
Initially, the opportunity to appeal to a judicial body of 
such standing was recognised as a means to ensure an 
independent judiciary as well as to provide a check on the 
quality of judgments given by New Zealand courts. While the 
appropriateness of the Board has often been questioned 
throughout its era of interaction with New Zealand, ( 2) in 
recent years the reliance placed on the Judicial Committee 
has come to be a source of increasing controversy. However, 
it appears that the role of the Privy Council is a matter 
which New Zealand will not have to grapple with for much 
longer as the Government has announced that it intends to 
abolish the right of appeal within this term.(3} 
Given that the future of the Board has thus been decided, 
the question remains as to what effect the Judicial 
Committee has had on the development of law within this 
country. This paper aims to answer this question: firstly 
by outlining the structure within which the right of appeal 
is available; then by considering ways in which our law has 
been influenced by the Privy Council other than through the 
straightforward application of the doctrine of precedent; and 
finally by analysing the New Zealand Privy Council appeal 
cases in order to determine the Judicial Committees's direct 
effect on different areas of the law. The results of such an 
analysis suggest that subject to three exceptions, the Board 
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has generally not played such a significant part in the 
development of New Zealand law as one would expect of a final 
appellate court. The exceptions are found in the areas of 
constitutional law, contract and taxation. 
BACXGROUJfD 
The Judicial Committee was created by statute in 1833.(4) 
It replaced the "old Appeals Committee" which had heard all 
appeals to the King in Council from 1696. The theory lying 
behind such appeals was that the King was the source and 
dispenser of justice throughout his dominions and was 
therefore the author! ty to be resorted to in any case of 
grievance by error, delay or obstruction in the ordinary 
courts. ( 5) The King always exercised jurisdiction in his 
Council which acted in an advisory basis. As Parliament 
developed out of the Council, the House of Lords became 
entrusted with the power of declaring the law in England, 
leaving the King in Council with appellate jurisdiction in 
the overseas dominions.(6) 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council differed from 
the previous advisory bodies in that councillors who were not 
lawyers by profession were excluded from membership. Today, 
the Judicial Committee consists of the Lord President of the 
Council, the Lord Chancellor, ex Lord Presidents, 
of Appeal in Ordinary, such other members of 
the Lords 
the Privy 
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Council who hold or have held high judicial off ice and two 
other Privy Councillors who may be appointed by the Sovereign 
by sign manual. Membership has also been extended to 
include Councillors who are or have been Chief Justice or a 
Justice of the Superior Courts of the Dominions.(7) 
Initially,from the time of its establishment in 1841, 
appeal to the Judicial Committee lay by virtue of prerogative 
power from the Supreme Court. 
The first specific provision for such appeals was made by an 
Imperial Order in Council in 1860. In 1871 regular provision 
was made for appeals from the Court of Appeal, ( 8) with 
provisions for appeals direct from the 
retained.(9) The grounds for appeal 
substantially unaltered to the present day. 
Supreme Court 
have remained 
New Zealand appeals to the Privy Council are now regulated 
by the Privy Council (Judicial Committee) Rules Notice 1973. 
In short, an appeal lies: 
i) as of right, from a final judgment of the Court of 
Appeal where the matter or claim is of the value of, 
at least, $5,000;(10) 
ii) at the discretion of the Court of Appeal, from any 
judgment - final or interlocutory - of that Court if 
that Court considers the issue to be of great general 
or public importance;(ll) 
iii) at the discretion of the High Court, from any final 
judgment of that Court if that Court considers the 
issue to be one of great general or public importance 
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such that it ought to be submitted to His (sic) Majesty 
in Council for decision;(12) 
iv) at the discretion of the Privy Council. (13) 
The Judicial Committee will only grant special leave to 
appeal in civil cases. (14) 
.... where the case is of gravity involving matters 
of public interest or some important question of 
law, or affecting property of considerable amount, 
or where the case is otherwise of some public 
importance or of a very substantial character. 
The conditions that must be satisfied before leave to 
appeal will be granted in criminal cases are even stricter 
as was clearly stated in Re Abraham Malby Dillet: (15) 
The rule has been repeatedly laid down, and has been 
invariably followed, that Her Majesty will not review 
or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, 
unless it is shown that, by a disregard of the forms of 
legal process, or by some violation of the principles 
of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial and grave 
injustice has been done. 
The Board has applied this test to hopeful New Zealand 
applications, denying a number of petitions for special leave 
to appeal. (16) 
In fact, the Board has only heard five prosecutions 
from New Zealand, one of which, Annie Brown v Attorney-
General for New Zealand ( 1 7) was only granted because their 
Lordships were under a misapprehension of facts. In Crown 
Millin_g_ Co. Ltd. V The King(18)the Judicial Committee 
overturned the Court of Appeal on the ground that the Crown 
had failed to prove a monopoly which was contrary to the 
public interest. While it does seem peculiar that the Board 
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should overturn a Hew Zealand court on the basis that the 
latter did not understand the public interest of Hew Zealand, 
the Board made a point of noting the discrepancy between the 
local judges on the question, then holding that the Crown had 
failed to discharge its burden of proof.It is interesting to 
note that the three other criminal appeals{l9) have all been 
heard since 1975, inviting the question of whether criminal 
appeals are now more readily entertained by the Judicial 
Committee. However, Hakhla v R(20) was appealed with leave 
of the Court of Appeal, the appeal then being allowed by the 
Board after a consideration of English cases which the Court 
of Appeal had not allowed to influence the case,apparently 
feeling itself bound by an earlier decision of its own. (21) 
Nakhla is thus an illustration of the importance of allowing 
a court of last resort (in this instance the Court of Appeal 
may be such a court as regards er iminal appeals) to depart 
from an earlier decision of that court. The issue of stare 
decisis in the Court of Appeal will be returned to later. 
The other two criminal appeals were dismissed; McDonald(22) 
highlighting the importance of the Court of Appeal in 
criminal cases by expressing that extraordinary circumstances 
would be necessary before the Board would interfere with a 
judge's determination on admissibility of evidence which the 
Court of Appeal had approved; and Kaitamaki(23) reaffirming 
the Court of Appeal's construction of the rape provisions in 
the Crimes Act 1961. It can thus be seen that the area of 
criminal law is one into which the Judicial Committee is 
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reluctant to interfere, and into which the Board has 
consequently not had a great effect. 
THE CBALLKMGE TO SOVERKIGMTY 
The Privy Council has undoubtedly served a useful and 
important role in New Zealand's history. In the early days 
of the colony, appeal to an external English body was seen as 
maintaining a high, independent standard of law which, it was 
believed, local courts could not have attained alone. 
British subjects were reassured by the appeal to His (sic) 
Majesty in Council. 
Such a satisfied colonial perspective no longer surrounds 
the Judicial Committee's relations with members of the 
Commonwealth. Instead, its memory is perhaps the basis for 
one of the most widely heard arguments for abolition of the 
final appeal to the Board: that such an appeal is demeaning 
of our national sovereignty. New Zealand attained 
legislative independence in 1947(24) and today any thought of 
subordination to the United Kingdom parliament is 
inconceivable. Yet the same cannot be said for the 
judicial branch of power which remains subject to a colonial 
relation of 148 years. However, the mere fact of appeal does 
not of itself represent an imposition upon our sovereignty as 
it is New Zealand that has the power to determine the value 
of an appeal to the Board. It is due to New Zealand's choice 
(although admittedly the decision to date has been passive) 
that the right of appeal has been retained. Prima facie, 
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therefore,appeal to the Judicial Committee is not demeaning 
of New Zealand's sovereignty unless there is no actual 
validity in the retention of the appeal and the substantive 
effects of their Lordships' opinions detracts from New 
Zealand's autonomy. 
Should the Appeal to the Board be retained? 
The New Zealand Law Society presented to the Royal 
Commission on the Courts the basic arguments for and against 
Privy Council appeals from a Unitary state.(25) The 
following arguments for retaining the appeal were 
advanced: ( 2 6) 
1. Having a right of appeal to the Judicial Committee means 
that the highest calibre of legal expertise is available 
to litigants at no extra cost to the New Zealand 
taxpayer. 
2. The Privy Council acts as a check on the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal. The existence 
appeal has a significant ef feet 
judgments of that Court. 
of a right of further 
on the quality of the 
3. The physica1 separation of the Privy Council from New 
Zealand gives it a greater measure of detachment than a 
local court. As New Zealand is a small nation with a 
small population it is impossible for its judges to be 
divorced from local influences. 
4. The United Kingdom by reason of its population has a 
larger reservoir of judicial talent. 
5. The appeal to the Privy Council is essential to maintain 
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a two-tier appeal system. A second right of appeal is 
necessary to ensure that, following the determinations of 
fact in the High Court, the legal argument has the 
opportunity to develop and mature. This facilitates the 
process by which legal argument is crystallised and 
refined to the essential issues. 
The first argument may be er i ticised on the basis that, 
while it considers the cost saving made by the New Zealand 
taxpayer, it ignores the considerable expense involved to the 
litigant. Such expense goes beyond that which must 
necessar i 1 y be incurred in a second appeal as it must also 
take account of airfare, accommodation and agency costs in 
London. The cost of an appeal prices most New Zealanders out 
of the market, leaving only the Crown, substantial 
corporations or wealthy litigants able to sustain an appeal. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that there are specific 
instances where litigants have been forced to compromise due 
to the threat of an appeal to the Judicial Committee. (27) 
The second argument put forward for retention of the 
appeal to the Judicial Committee is a more difficult matter 
to assess. With an appeal rate of 1.18 per year (175 appeals 
have been heard since 1840) it seems unlikely that the fear 
of having a judgment overturned 
factor in ensuring the quality 
on 
of 
appeal is a significant 
the Court of 
Appeal gives. Further, a "success" 
judgment 
rate of one-in-three 
appeals(33.3%) occurs in a high proportion of appellate 
systems. (28) New Zealand statistics accord with this figure: 
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of the 175 appeals to the Judicial Committee, 60 were allowed 
(34.3%), 102 dismissed (58.3%), and 13 varied (7%). (29) As 
these figures 
appellate court 
merit of Court 
merely 
it is 
indicate the 
difficult to 
normal 
assess 
of Appeal judgments with 
workings of an 
the comparative 
decisions of the 
Judicial Committee. Also, many cases which reach the apex of 
our appellate level involve interpretations of law which 
are arrived at by an evaluation of policy considerations. 
These cases reflect areas of the law which are uncertain and 
where there is no strictly "right" or "wrong" answer. The 
fact that the final appellate court makes a different 
determination of the law does not mean that the former court 
was wrong as both views are often legitimate interpretations. 
This point is illustrated by the words of Justice Jackson 
of the United States Supreme Court: "We are not final because 
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final". ( 30) The Board's jurisdiction can therefore be 
questioned in that firstly, a second appellate tier is simply 
not necessary and secondly, that where policy considerations 
are at issue, it is inappropriate that a body external to New 
Zealand should be involved: i.e. the New Zealand courts are 
in a better position to evaluate the effect of various policy 
matters than are the members of the Judicial Committee. 
Inherent in the above criticisms is that the objective of 
the judicial system must not be seen solely as a means of 
obtaining the "right" answer but as a means of bringing about 
a final determination of disputes. ( 31) The system should 
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ensure that this is done equitably and expeditiously - a test 
more easily satisfied by a final court in New Zealand than in 
London. 
The third argument in effect suggests that the New Zealand 
judiciary is not independent and probably never will be due 
to the size of our country. This is greatly contested by 
many commentators, Robson(32) contending that not only are 
our judges sufficiently independent today but that they have 
been so since the turn of the century. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the independence of the Court of Appeal 
was questioned by some following Re Erebus Royal Commission; 
Air New Zealand Ltd. v Mahon.(33) The Judicial Committee's 
subsequent dismissal of the appeal(34) thus provided an 
external assessment of the Court of Appeal's decision and was 
able to impliedly refute the allegation that the New Zealand 
court was biased in favour of Air New Zealand. Despite the 
Erebus case, it cannot seriously be suggested in New Zealand 
today that the judiciary are anything but independent. 
In fact, the more concerning side to this argument is its 
opposite implication - i.e. rather than the Court of Appeal 
being too involved with local influences, the Judicial 
Committee is too removed from them. 
sufficient knowledge 
legislation peculiar 
and expertise of 
to New Zealand. 
The Board lacks 
local conditions and 
This situation is 
becoming more obvious as English jurisprudence is influenced 
by the United Kingdom's membership of the European Economic 
Community. 
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The Board has at times made it clear that it will not 
interfere with a finding of facts of the local courts. For 
instance in Reid v Reid the Judicial Committee said of the 
concurrent findings by the trial Judge and the Court of 
Appeal that the contribution of the husband to the marriage 
partnership had clearly been greater than that of the 
wife: (35) 
This is essentially the sort of issue which the Courts 
of the society to which the spouses belong are in a 
position far superior to that of their Lordships in 
forming a judgement. 
However, other decisions of the Board make it apparent that 
its understanding of New Zealand circumstances is not as 
clear as one would expect and that the situations where the 
Board does defer to the local courts opinion are relatively 
rare. 
There is also some controversy between the Board and the 
New Zealand Courts as to when it is appropriate for the local 
courts to develop their own doctrine in a particular sphere 
of law. This will be discussed later in the paper but is 
mentioned now as an indication that the existence of the 
right of appeal has inhibited the growth of New Zealand law. 
(36) The Judicial Committee thus lacks the sensitivity to 
know when local conditions necessarily negate the value of 
its interference. It appears that until the Court of Appeal 
is free to act in a completely autonomous manner, it cannot 
effectively develop New Zealand law for New Zealand 
conditions. (37) 
There appears to be little merit in the fourth argument 
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for retention of the appeal; that New Zealand does not have 
the depth of judicial talent necessary for a final appellate 
court. In many ways the Court of Appeal already is the final 
appellate court given the infrequent appeals its decisions 
are subject to. Even when the appeals are allowed the rate 
is within that expected of an appellate court(38) which 
suggests that the judgments given by the New Zealand courts 
are of the required standard. Indeed, the low number of 
appeals from the Court of Appeal may in fact reflect general 
confidence in that court. (39) 
The fifth argument; that a second right of appeal is 
necessary to allow legal argument to be refined to the 
essential issues somewhat ignores the fact that the vast 
majority of appeals today do not get such a second chance and 
generally do not seem the worse for having missed it. 
Nonetheless, even if a second right of appeal should be 
considered desirable, (40) it is clear from the foregoing 
legal arguments as well as the current political climate that 
the Judicial Committee should not be that second appellate 
body. 
Having 
appeal to 
they have 
considered the arguments for retention of the 
the Judicial Committee it becomes apparent that 
very little legitimate backing. It was stated 
earlier(41) that as New Zealand had elected to retain the 
services of the Judicial Committee they were not per se an 
infringement on our effective sovereignty unless there was no 
validity in the retention of the appeal or the effect of the 
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decisions themselves was demeaning to New Zealand's autonomy. 
As the first of these conditions has now been fulfilled it is 
appropriate to consider whether the hearing of appeals by the 
Judicial Committee is more than a theoretical infringement of 
sovereignty. Hughes(42) believes it is in two ways: 
1. The Judicial Committee is constituted and regulated 
largely by only one of the members of the Commonwealth 
over which the others have no control.(43) 
2. The existence of the Judicial Committee interferes with 
the powers of the Dominions to regulate their own 
jurisdiction in their territories.(44) 
Given that New Zealand's sovereignty is thus diminished by 
the right of appeal which cannot be justifiably retained, it 
is easy to see at least one of the major reasons why other 
Commonwealth countries have disposed of the right of appeal. 
Reaction within the Commonwealth to the Privy Council's 
Jurisdiction 
Few members of the Commonwealth other than New Zealand have 
achieved independence and retained the Judicial Committee's 
services. Of those which have, New Zealand is 
distinctive due to its political stability. Attempts to 
explain this often focus on our small population and/or 
sentimental ties with the United Kingdom.(45) Indeed, it is 
often New Zealand commentators who are the most offended by 
our traditional link with the Board:(46) 
Of the old Commonwealth only New Zealand hesitates; 
cultural sentiment and colonial mind-sets are still 
powerful forces here. But the result is inevitable; only 
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the political will is lacking, and until the day the Court 
of Appeal of this country is finally recognised as the 
ultimate court of this land, that remaining vestige of 
colonialism will continue to frustrate the creation of a 
truly New Zealand culture. 
Comparing the relatively small population size of 
New Zealand to many states which have abolished the appeal, 
the pattern is not entirely consistent as Sierra Leone is a 
state which had a population of approximately 2. 8 million 
when it abolished appeals to the Privy Council in 1972.(47) 
Before a state can successfully abolish the appeal to the 
Privy Council, the judiciary must be willing to take over 
from the Judicial Committee. Such an attitude was apparent in 
both Canada and Australia for quite some time before the 
appeal was finally disposed of.(48) 
In contrast, it appears to be only recently that New 
Zealand judges have felt confident enough to make the same 
stand in 1976, Sir Thaddeus McCarthy spoke of it only being 
a matter of time before the link with the Privy Council would 
go, but intimated that it would not necessarily be in the 
immediate future.(49) Sir Robin Cooke accepted as recently 
as 1987 that the point of no return has come: (50) 
We must accept responsibility for our own national legal 
destiny and recognise that the Privy Council appeal has 
outlived its time. Not to take the obvious decision now 
would be to renounce part of our nationhood. 
The existence of such an attitude is to some extent 
necessary if the judiciary are to take on an existence 
independent of the United Kingdom. If such a mentality is 
not prevalent then the effect of abolishing appeals to the 
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Privy Council will be limited by the retention of colonial 
attitudes, resulting in a dependence beyond that which is 
desirable upon House of Lords judgments as well as Privy 
Council decisions pertaining to different jurisdictions. 
An indication of why many Commonwealth nations have 
abolished the right of appeal to the Privy Council may be 
gained from an examination of the reversal rates of different 
states: (51) 
Table 1: Affirmative/Reversal (1829 to 1971) 
Canada 
Australia 
India-Burma-
Ceylon 
West Indies 
New Zealand 
390 312 (44.4%) 
278 212 (43.2%) 
1471 
83 
65 
1068 
107 
42 
(42.0%) 
(56.3%) 
(39.2%) 
The reversal rate reflected here is somewhat higher than one 
normally expects from an appellate court.(52) This suggests 
that the Privy Council was, to some extent, forcing legal 
development in the directions which it desired rather than 
following the jurisdiction from which the cases emanate. If 
it can be said that the relatively high rate of reversals was 
a factor which has influenced Canada's and Australia's 
decision to abolish the appeals, although the quality of 
reversals is of course more important than the quantity, then 
New Zealand's slightly lower rate may explain somewhat both 
why our legislature and our courts have been more content to 
remain subject to the Judicial Committee. The fact that so 
few appeals have been heard is possibly another reason why 
New Zealand has remained with the status quo as the Board's 
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interference with New Zealand law is, in terms of quantity, 
small. 
Some of the countries which have retained the appeal have 
nonetheless placed certain limits on its use. Hong Kong for 
example only has an appeal as of right where the sum is 
$HK500, OOO or more. ( 53) The existence of such a limitation 
is at least proof that some thought has been given to the 
suitability of the Board as the final appellate court. The 
sum required in New Zealand before an appeal may be heard as 
of right, $5,000,(54) reflects the fact that it is some time 
since the regulations dealing with the appeals have been 
reviewed. In fact, even the introduction of the new sum in 
1972 was criticised for its lack of consideration and the 
method by which it was introduced.(55) 
There is no doubt that the trend throughout the 
Commonwealth has been to disengage the services of the 
Judicial Committee once both political independence and a 
sufficient level of judicial strength have been reached. It 
is well recognised that the abolition of the appeal is not 
necessarily a slight to the United Kingdom but merely a 
positive step in the growth of the dominion. As one English 
judge, Lord Normand, has said:(56) 
There is also the question whether the loss of dominion 
appeals is to be deplored, or whether we may not even 
regard it as a sign of the fulfilment of the purpose for 
which the appeal jurisdiction has always existed. 
INDIRECT EFFECT OP THE PRIVY COUNCIL ON "NEW ZEALAND LAW" 
There are two underlying assumptions behind this section 
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of the paper. The first is that there has in fact been the 
development of a distinct "New Zealand law" in some areas, 
promulgated both by the legislature and the Court of Appeal. 
The second is that this is good. The latter assumption 
recognises that different social and political considerations 
call for divergences within the law throughout the 
Commonwealth. It recognises that there must be a uniform 
common law approach but that the focus of such an approach 
should be intra-state rather than international. 
I. Stare Decisis in the Court of Appeal 
Part of the Privy Council's influence on New Zealand law 
can be determined by the ef feet it has on the Court of 
Appeal. Prima facie, the latter is bound by rulings of 
the former where the appeal came from New Zealand. Is 
it, however, bound by its own decisions? If the Court 
does not consider itself bound by its own earlier 
decisions, it may be encroaching upon the traditional 
role of a final appellate court. It may be causing 
unwanted inconsistency and uncertainty in the law and it 
may be undermining the authority of the Judicial 
Committee. 
Alternatively, if there is a distinct New Zealand 
common law emerging, it must arise from within New 
Zealand courts. ( 57) Thus there will be occasions when, 
because of changing social and economic factors, the 
N.Z.C.A. will not want to follow an earlier decision of 
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its own but rather to develop the law in a manner 
consistent with current conditions. Secondly, given the 
infrequent rate of appeals to the Privy Council,it must 
be recognised that in the vast majority of cases the 
Court of Appeal is in reality the final appellate court 
for New Zealand. 
Of course, it is accepted that there should be some 
situations in which the Court is not bound by its own 
decisions. Orchard suggests two main ways in which the 
Court's power to overrule its own decisions may be 
fettered.(58) The first occurs where the Court adopts a 
rule that it is bound by its previous decisions, subject 
to a limited number of specified exceptions. In the 
second situation the Court declares that it will normally 
follow its earlier decisions, but will reject them in 
exceptional cases where it appears right to do so. 
Orchard advocates that the N.Z.C.A. should adopt the 
latter. 
However, in Attorney-General of St. Christopher, Nevis 
and Anguil·la v Reynolds ( 59) the Privy Council made it 
clear that an intermediate appellate court should fall 
within the former category ( 60) . The statement in that 
case was obiter. It has since been heavily criticised as 
ill-considered. (61) 
Reynolds is particularly odd when compared with the 
Board's opinion in Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners 
v Gibbs Bright il Firm). ( 62) In the latter case, a mere 
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five years before Reynolds, the Judicial Committee 
accepted that the High Court of Australia has always 
possessed the power to refuse to follow its own previous 
decision if it should think fit. Despite this, Australia 
was not excluded from the ambit of the statement in 
Reynolds. 
It is submitted that the N.Z.C.A. is justified in not 
following their Lordship's advice on this issue as the 
statement in Reynolds was obiter, it was ill-considered 
and clearly inconsistent with Gibbs Bright. This appears 
to be a course the Court of Appeal has chosen to follow. 
In Howley v Lawrence Publishing Co. Ltd. (63) a majority 
of the full bench of the Court rejected the restrictions 
imposed by the Young ( 64) case. While the outcome in 
Howley was a majority decision, it is clear that in a 
"proper" ( 65) case the whole court would be prepared to 
adopt a more flexible approach to the principle of stare 
decisis than is available to the English Court of Appeal. 
Richardson J appears to advocate an approach similar to 
that used by the House of Lords:(66) 
This Court has the final responsibility within New 
Zealand for the administration of the laws of New 
Zealand and while its decisions are subject to review 
by the Privy Council few litigants, less than one 
percent of those unsuccessful in this Court, feel able 
to follow that path. It is I think unwise to 
formulate any absolute rule. I tend to the view that 
we should go no further than to indicate that this 
Court will ordinarily follow its earlier decisions but 
will be prepared to review and affirm, modify or 
overrule an earlier decision where it is satisfied it 
will do so, but without attempting to categorise in 
advance the class of cases in which it will 
intervene. 
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It thus appears that despite the Judicial Committee's opinion 
in Reynolds, the N.Z.C.A. will not adhere to the rule in 
Young. This means that when the appeal to the Privy Council 
is lost, the Court is ready if necessary, to take over as the 
final appellate court without having to reassess its position 
on the issue of stare decisis. Also, the ability to 
reconsider its own decisions places the Court in a better 
position to develop a distinctly New Zealand common law. 
However, it is clear that this is not a state of affairs 
which the Privy Council has sought to encourage, rather it 
has actively tried to restrict such development. This can be 
seen not only from the Judicial Committee's treatment of the 
stare decisis question for intermediate appellate courts but 
also in the Board's insistence upon uniformity. 
II. The Desirability of Consistent and Uniform Development of 
the Law throughout the Commonwealth 
The Judicial Committee has this enormous 
responsibility that it is the only agency for securing 
any measure of uniformity in legal development over 
the whole of this vast Empire. It exercises a 
jurisdiction which involves knowledge of some four or 
five, or more, completely different kinds of 
jurisprudence, dating from the unknown past.(67) 
Statements such as this suggest that there should be a 
field of law to which the whole Commonwealth is subject, and 
that it is the place of the Privy Council to ensure such 
consistency. While such uniformity clearly does not exist 
today(68) the Board still seems to consider that it must 
repress individualistic tendencies from countries subject to 
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its jurisdiction. (69) Such an attitude raises many issues 
for the New Zealand courts, including: 
1. Which pronouncements, if any, of the Judicial Committee, 
House of Lords and the English Court of Appeal should be 
binding? and 
2. Should a rearguard attempt be made to promote the unity of 
the common law, or should the courts, while treating 
English decisions as persuasive, feel free to develop the 
law in response to peculiarly local conditions and needs? 
Considering first the nature of Privy Council appeals 
which are binding on the New Zealand Court of Appeal the 
prima facie assumption is that only cases proceeding from 
that court can have such effect as appeals from other 
jurisdictions are, despite the uniform Commonwealth approach, 
from a different court hierarchy. Nonetheless, there is 
support for such a proposition emanating from cases such as 
Trimble v Hill(70) and Fatuma Bakhshuwen v Bakhshuwen. (71) 
Such a view sees the Privy Council as the decisive judicial 
body throughout the Commonwealth, its decisions in one sphere 
necessarily affecting the whole sub-structure which is 
subject to it: (72) 
The traditional view, following naturally from the aim of 
uniformity expressed in Trimble v Hall, seems to be that 
judgments of the Privy Council apply to all territories of 
which it is the superior court regardless of the origin of 
the action. 
The multiple effect view of the Board's decisions may cause 
enormous difficulties where different legal rules have 
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developed in different territories. Such difficulties will 
be increased if the law throughout the Commonwealth is not 
addressed in each case so that the effect on territories who 
will be indirectly affected is not considered. If this does 
not happen, the multiple effect theory is likely to lead to 
fundamental changes of doctrine without due consideration of 
the authorities which form the basis of such a doctrine. The 
New Zealand case of Frazer v Walker ( 73) is an example of 
where the Board has seemingly ignored the effect a decision 
in one jurisdiction may have on another. In that case the 
Judicial Committee referred only to decisions dealing 
specifically with the law of New Zealand with the single 
exception of its own decision in Gibbs v Messer. (74) This 
was despite the strong similarities between the legislation 
in question and that of Australia. The Australian case was 
distinguished and a new point of law settled. (75) The danger 
represented by the Judicial Committee giving a decision 
concerning the interpretations of provisions very similar to 
an Australian statute without a discussion of Australian 
authorities and without an indication as to the width of its 
binding ef feet can be illustrated by Mayer v Coe. ( 76) In 
this case, Street J. held in 1968 that he was bound, in the 
light of the Bakhshuwen(77) principle and the acceptance by 
the High Court of the application to Australia of Privy 
Council decisions on statutory provisions similar to those of 
an Australian state, to follow Frazer v Walker. This is 
herein referred to as a danger because it means accepting a 
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change in Australian law without considering whether such a 
change is desirable or specifically appropriate for 
Australian conditions, the case having been decided in the 
New Zealand context. 
It may, however, still be legitimate not to follow Privy 
Council decisions of other territories. Such a position is 
the logical extension of Australian Consolidated Press v Uren 
(78) where it was recognised that Australia could develop its 
law differently from that of England. Thus Judicial 
Committee determinations of appeals from other places are not 
necessarily the result of applying the common law of England 
and therefore may not be binding as they represent an 
exception to the uniform and consistent approach. A more 
recent and far-reaching affirmation of the point in Uren is 
found in Jamil Bin Harun v Yang Kamsiah(79) where Lord 
Scarman recognised that it was for the Malaysian courts to 
decide whether to follow English case law: (80) 
On appeal the Judicial Committee would ordinarily accept 
the view of the Federal Court as to the persuasiveness of 
modern English case law in the circumstances of the States 
of Malaysia, unless it could be demonstrated that the 
Federal Court had over looked or misconstrued some 
statutory provision or had committed some error of legal 
principle recognised and accepted in Malaysia. 
Such a view is a far-cry from the uniform and consistent 
claim referred to earlier by Lord Atkin. Nonetheless, it 
should be accepted for it will lead to a more uniform system 
of law within a country than will the adoption of the 
multiple effect theory. Unfortunately the question still 
remains as to whether all countries are as free to choose 
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when English law is applicable. 
If the Privy Council considers that English law is 
applicable to the case in issue, the position of the House of 
Lords' decisions must be considered. Lord Scarman's recent 
remarks in the Privy Council opinion, on appeal from Hong 
Kong, in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. 
are illuminating on this point:(81) 
Once it is accepted, as in this case it is, that the 
applicable law is English, their Lordships of the Judicial 
Committee will follow a House of Lords' decision which 
covers the point in issue. The Judicial Committee is not 
the final judicial authority for the determination of 
English law. That fs the responsibility of the House of 
Lords in its judicial capacity. Though the Judicial 
Committee enjoys a greater freedom from the binding effect 
of precedent than does the House of Lords, it is in no 
position on a question of English law to invoke the 
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)[1966] I W.L.R. 
1234 of July 1966 pursuant to which the House has assumed 
the power to depart in certain circumstances from a 
previous decision of the House .... It is, of course, open 
to the Judicial Committee to depart from a House of Lords' 
decision in a case where, by reason of custom, statute, or 
for other reasons peculiar to the jurisdiction where the 
matter in dispute arose, the Judicial Committee is 
required to determine whether English law should or should 
not apply. Only if it be decided or accepted (as in this 
case) that English law is the law to be applied will the 
Judicial Committee consider itself bound to follow a House 
of Lords' decision. 
It thus appears that where a matter of English law is before 
the Privy Council, it will be bound by the House of Lords. 
Therefore, on such a matter the local courts should also be 
bound by the House of Lords. 
Consequently, the distinction between English and "non-
English(?)" law is crucial to determine 
the extent to which the New Zealand courts are bound to 
follow cases from other jurisdictions. Where the Privy 
25 
Council gives an opinion which is based on English law, this 
appears to be binding on New Zealand courts regardless of the 
origin of the decision unless the existence of "local 
circumstances" can distinguish the case in issue. Similarly, 
the New Zealand courts are effectively bound by a decision of 
the House of Lords where the appropriate law is English. 
Therefore, if Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd(82) is to be given 
the wide effect their Lordships apparently intended, the New 
Zeal'and Court of Appeal must deny the applicability of 
English law before departing from the authority of House of 
Lords or Privy Council decisions. As the Judicial Committee 
has not expressly stated that the New Zealand courts have the 
power to determine the issue, as they did regarding the 
Malaysian Federal Court,(83) reliance must be placed on the 
doctrine of "local circumstances". Where local circumstances 
are found to exist, the 
of English law 
presumption 
is rebutted, 
in favour of 
thus leaving application 
local courts with an opportunity to develop the law 
appropriately in line with the needs of their country. 
the 
the 
more 
However, precisely where local circumstances begin and end 
is not clear. Some of the difficulties an appeal court may 
face in an attempt to assert its own view of the law when it 
is contrary to that accepted by the Privy Council are evident 
in O'Connor v Hart. (84) 
This case concerns the criteria for which a contract may 
be set aside on the basis of mental incapacity. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal held that a contract entered into by 
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a person of unsound mind is voidable at that person's option 
if it is proved that the contract was unfair to the person of 
unsound mind. The Court gave a strong decision affirming its 
earlier decision Archer v Cutler(85), and stating that 
"this principle should be adopted for · New Zealand". ( 86) The 
Court thus recognised that it was not strictly following 
English law but believed that the departure was warranted. 
It is apparent that the Court of Appeal is receptive to such 
departures from English law as evidenced by the recent speech 
of the Right Honourable Sir Robin Cooke at the 1987 New 
Zealand Law Conference:(87) 
Direct debate of policy considerations, and with an eye to 
interests transcending those of the immediate parties, has 
become commonplace. Without exaggeration it may be said 
to be regular fare in the Court of Appeal. 
However, whether this should be so liberally encouraged in 
light of the developments in Hart V O'Connor is 
questionnable. The appeal to the Judicial Committee was 
allowed, the Board being of the opinion that the case was not 
dependent on local circumstances and that therefore English 
law should apply. 
Board: ( 88) 
Lord Brightman stated the opinion of the 
If Archer v Cutler is properly to be regarded as a 
decision based on considerations peculiar to New Zealand, 
it is highly improbable that their Lordships would think 
it right to impose their own interpretation of the law, 
thereby contradicting the unanimous conclusions of the 
High Court and the Court of appeal of New Zealand on a 
matter of local significance. If, however, the principle 
of Archer v Cutler, if it be correct, must be regarded as 
having general application throughout all jurisdictions 
based on the common law, because it does not depend on 
local considerations, their Lordships could not properly 
treat the unanimous view of the Courts of New Zealand as 
being necessarily decisive. In their Lordships' opinion 
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the latter is the correct view of the decision. 
It would thus appear that unless local circumstances 
are present the New Zealand courts must follow English 
law. In fact, the Board seems to implicitly say that all 
common law jurisdictions must, in the absence of local 
circumstances, apply the same common law. While this 
principle undeniably fetters the development of a distinct 
New Zealand law, without it the law of New Zealand would 
be whatever the New Zealand courts said it was, which 
would leave the Judicial Committee with little or no role 
as an appellate tribunal.(89) 
Therefore, if New Zealand courts wish to pursue a 
different line of reasoning from English courts but cannot 
find any local circumstances to justify such a departure, 
it appears that their decisions may be set aside on 
appeal as contrary to English law. Such restrictions on 
the Court of Appeal represent a strong argument for 
abolition of the right of appeal. For if the Court of 
Appeal continues to act in the way condemned in Hart, as 
Sir Robin Cooke's speech suggests it will in fact do, then 
a body of law distinct to New Zealand may well develop 
only to be overturned on a sporadic appeal. Such a 
situation must not continue. 
Interestingly, it is at least arguable that earlier 
authority did not preclude the view of the law taken by 
McMullin J in Archer v Cutler. (90) Such a view is put 
forward by Mr Cato who alleges that the Judicial Committee 
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misread English authority and displayed a questionnable 
appreciation of Commonwealth authority.(91) If Mr Cato is 
correct then credence is given to the argument that the 
reversal of Hart v O'Connor(92) was due to the conflicting 
communitarianism values which the NZCA holds and the 
liberal approach taken by the Privy Council: (93) 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal is motivated by 
compassion and paternalism, both of which are virtues 
of communitarianism. While the Privy Council, in 
insisting upon the promisee' s knowledge of the 
promiser's mental incompetence before intervening to 
void the transact ion, perpetuates a 1 i beral view of 
contract which is preoccupied with consent, and fault, 
the equivalent in contract law being advantage taking. 
Such divergence in methods of approaching a case can have 
an important ef feet on the development of the law. Yet 
because it is implicit in a judgment, rather than directly 
identifiable, the importance of different approaches often 
remains undetected. Where an appeal is al lowed on the 
basis of a legal method it is clear that the courts should 
at least be applying the same method. Thus if the New 
Zealand courts wish to continue with a method of reasoning 
not shared by the Judicial Committee, as appears to be the 
case, conflict will necessarily be the result. This is 
clearly unsatisfactory. 
Despite the Board's "leniency" towards other 
jurisdictions ( for example in al lowing Malaysian courts 
the discretion to determine whether English law is 
applicable), it appears that the full independence of New 
Zealand common law real 1 y only commences where "local 
circumstances" begin. A contrary view has been argued by 
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McHugh, (94) based on the English Laws Act 1908, that the 
only non-local cases which have obligatory effect, as 
opposed to being merely persuasive, are those handed down 
before 1840 which are applicable to New Zealand's 
circumstances. However, unless {or until) this is 
accepted, the Privy Council will only allow a distinct 
"New Zealand common law" in those matters where our local 
circumstances 
jurisdictions. 
set us apart from other common law 
Consequently, it is clear that the Privy Council has 
had quite a major impact on the law of New Zealand by the 
indirect means of the promotion of a uniform and 
consistent law, i.e. English law, in conjunction with the 
multiple effect of the Board's decisions. While it is 
difficult to quantify the degree of influence these have 
resulted in, it is obviously significant. However, much of 
this influence is due to the importance of English 
doctrine generally rather than the specific effect of the 
Privy Council. 
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ANALYSIS OP PRIVY COUNCIL DECISIONS OM APPEAL PROM MEW 
ZEALAND 
In the 147 years in which an appeal to the Judicial 
Committee has been available from New Zealand, only 175 such 
cases have been heard by the Board. This means that the 
Board hears an average of just over one (1.2) case on appeal 
from New Zealand each year. Such an infrequent rate gives 
credence to the theory that our Court of Appeal is the de 
facto if not de jure final appellate court. It also raises 
the question as to the direct effect the Judicial Committee 
has had on New Zealand law when it has had such a limited 
chance to intervene. This issue will now be considered . 
For the Board to have exerted a major influence on New 
Zealand law through its direct link in the New Zealand 
hierarchy it must have either done so by the direct effect of 
their Lordships' opinions or by inducing a trepidation in the 
Court of Appeal that their decisions would be be overturned 
on appeal, thereby ensuring that it gave judgments of which 
the Board would approve. The latter seems unlikely, 
particularly in the judicial climate which is prevalent today 
as evidenced by the encouragement given by the current Court 
of Appeal to counsel to pursue policy arguments , ( 95) proof 
that that Court is willing to consider deviating from the law 
as it is currently stated. It is also historically unlikely 
that fear of being overturned was a strong motivation behind 
the Court of Appeal as the conservative attitude many Judges 
tend to have provides a greater impunction to follow the 
traditional II Eng 1 ish 11 ( or uni form?) law than recourse to the 
,( 
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threat of appeal. Moreover, the frequency of appeals is so 
limited that the possibility of an appeal proceeding, let 
alone being allowed, is hardly likely to be a motivating 
force in a judgment. Thus, as the fear of having a judgment 
overturned by the Judicial Committee has not influenced New 
Zealand law, any such influence must be a direct result of 
their Lordships' opinions. 
An interesting feature of the way in which the Privy 
Council decisions were traditionally determined is the fact 
that they were unanimous . There is some conflict in opinion 
as to the effect that such lack of power to dissent has had 
on the development of the law throughout the Commonwealth. 
Gower ( 96) has argued that the current practice of allowing 
dissents(97) has destroyed the major purpose of the Judicial 
Committee as he sees it: to provide a limited unity of 
substantive law across the legal systems. In contrast, Lord 
Reid is clearly of the opinion that the ability to dissent 
has greatly improved the quality of Privy Council 
judgments:(98) 
If you compare the quality of Privy Council judgments with 
speeches in the House of Lords for a long time back , I 
think you will agree that from the point of view of 
developing the law Privy Council judgments have been much 
inferior ... The reason is that a single judgrnent must get 
the agreement of at least all in the majority so it tends 
to be no more than the highest common f ,..,. : , " : ' ~ j r 
views. 
Lord Reid must surely be right, as in finding consensus 
valuable insights into the law held by individual members of 
the court will be lost . Also, dissenting opinions sometimes 
provide the state in question with a viable alternative to 
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follow in a case where there is difficulty in applying the 
majority 
given by 
decision. Interestingly, the dissenting judgment 
Lord Oliver in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
Challenge Corporation Ltd(99) has received wide support in 
New Zealand while the majority decision has been both widely 
criticised by academics and avoided in the courts.(100) It 
is therefore submitted that the Privy Council's influence on 
New Zealand law has been limited by its traditional practice 
of only giving unanimous judgments. 
When considering the decisions given by the Judicial 
Committee, it is evident that most appeals which are allowed 
will necessarily influence the development of New Zealand 
whereas most cases which are affirmed will not. However, some 
cases in which the appeal is dismissed will have a bearing on 
the development of the law as they are decided by the Board 
on different grounds to those preferred by the Court of 
Appeal. Nonetheless, such cases are a minority and the 
extent of the influence which the Privy Council has directly 
exerted on New Zealand law can best be determined by an 
examination of the cases in which the appeal to the Board was 
allowed. 
The following figures show the reversal rate and frequency 
of appeals in ten year periods since the introduction of the 
appeal: 
Table 2. (101) 
1840-1899 
1900-1909 
1910-1919 
1920-1929 
1930-1939 
1940-1949 
1950-1959 
1960-1969 
1970-1979 
1980-
* 
Appeals 
Allowed 
8 
12 
2 
10 
6 
5 
0 
5 
7 
5 
60 
Appeals Other* Total 
Dismissed 
15 
14 
16 
9 
11 
2 
7 
7 
13 
8 
102 
2 
3 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
2 
13 
25 
29 
18 
20 
17 
7 
7 
12 
25 
15 
175 
Percentage of 
appeals allowed 
32%(allowed) 
41.38% 
11.11% 
50% 
35.29% 
71.43% 
0% 
41.56% 
28% 
33.33% 
34.29% 
appeal withdrawn by consent, judgment varied, 
petition for special leave to appeal refused. 
Note - where several appeals are dealt with in the same 
judgment, these are treated as one appeal for 
statistical purposes. 
An examination of the reversal rate indicates that, while 
there has been some considerable variation in the rate 
(ranging from 0%-71.43%), the overall percentage is 
equivalent to the one-in-three "success" rate found in a 
large number of appellate systems. Interestingly, when the 
success rates of final appellate courts between the years 
1960 and 1983 is considered, the statistics indicate that 
judgments on appeal from New Zealand were less likely to be 
reversed than were judgments on appeal from the English Court 
of Appeal to the House of Lords, and that the rate was less 
than the overall success rate on appeal to the Privy Council 
from all jurisdictions. 
Table 3: Success Rates of Final Appellate Courts, 
1960-1983. (102) 
Allowed 
House of Lords 460 
Privy Council -
all jurisdic-
tions 299 
Privy Council -
New Zealand 13 
Dismissed 
649 
491 
31 
Success Rate 
41% 
38% 
30% 
While this does not clarify the extent to which the 
Judicial Committee has influenced the law of New Zealand, it 
does indicate that the Board's influence here has not been 
significant when compared with other jurisdictions over which 
the Board presides. This conclusion is reached both by 
comparing the reversal rate of New Zealand (30%) to that of 
all jurisdictions (38%), and by considering the small number 
of appeals which the Board hears deriving from New Zealand 
(6%). 
It is notable when considering the statistics that there 
has not been a recent decline in the use of the appeal to the 
Board. Such a decline may have been anticipated if it was 
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accepted that the Board was an inappropriate institution to 
preside over New Zealand appeals. However, when the nature 
of appeals themselves is considered, it is evident that a 
party who is determined to get the result which is most 
favourable to his or her position will use every legal step 
available to do so. Thus, where a party is unhappy with a 
result in the Court of Appeal, the chance of "success" in the 
Judicial Committee and the cost and delay in getting judgment 
in that court may well determine whether an appeal is 
followed through but the appropriateness of the forum itself 
will not be a consideration. It is therefore difficult to 
imply anything from the fact that there have been quite large 
variations in the number of appeals heard in different 
decades. 
There is also a notable difference in reversal rates 
throughout the years . Although it is difficult to give a 
reason for this (each case being decided on its merits), it 
has been suggested that the composition of the Judicial 
Committee, particularly in the years just after the turn of 
the century, may have had something to do with the rate of 
reversals.(103) This is of course possible due to the 
different interpretations which may be placed on facts. Of 
course, while the Board may dispute the Court of Appeal I s 
interpretation of the law to the facts making its judgment, 
strictly speaking "incorrect", that does not necessarily mean 
that it cannot be legitimately justified. In other words 
there is always some discretion in a case for their Lordships 
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to differ with the Court of Appeal and the fact that some of 
their Lordships may be more willing to do so than others may 
be reflected in the differing reversal rates for different 
periods. 
Due to the small number of appeals the Board has heard 
from New Zealand, the reversal rate may easily be swayed. 
This is because in a decade when comparatively few appeals 
are heard, a relatively constant number of appeals allowed 
(as opposed to the appeal rate), may give a very high 
"success" rate despite the fact that the number of appeals 
allowed has remained constant. For instance, compare the 
figures for the periods of the 1940' s and the 1960 's. Such 
an analysis does not attempt to deny the val i d~ ty of 
percentages but merely to warn against taking them out of the 
context they are found in: i.e. a small data base . 
While much discussion has ensued regarding the question of 
whether the appeal to the Board should be retained, there has 
been very little empirical research into the effect the 
Board's decisions have had. Similarly, while some cases have 
provoked discussion on an individual basis there has been no 
attempt to consider the overall effect the Judicial Committee 
has had in particular areas of the law. It is this gap in 
research that the following part of the paper seeks to fill. 
Table 4 provides a breakdown of the subject matter of the 
reported appeals referred to in Table 1. Of the 175 
decisions, nine(104) have been categorised as involving more 
than one issue . Where several appeals are dealt with in the 
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same judgment, they have been treated as one case. 
Table 4. Breakdown of Subject-Matter of Cases Appealed(105) 
Subject-Matter Appeals Appeals Other Total 
Allowed Dismissed 
Commercial 20 26 1 47 
Trusts and Wills 7 7 1 15 
Public 10 8 18 
Criminal 2 3 5 
Torts 4 12 16 
Taxation 8 15 23 
Land&: lease 6 20 26 
Family 3 3 6 
Practice &: 
Procedure 1 3 11 15 
Other 3 10 13 
64 107 13 184 
It is thus clear that there is a considerable disparity 
between the various subject-matter groups as to the number of 
appeals allowed. Noteworthy for their high "success" rate 
are the areas of Commercial law, Trusts and Wills, Public law 
and Family law. Much lower rates are found in the areas of 
Criminal law, Torts, Land and Lease, Practice and Procedure 
and "Other''. The area of Taxation takes the middle ground 
with the "desired" success rate of one-in-three. 
Areas of law in which the appeal rate is over the "norm" 
(i.e.33%) are the areas in which it is most likely that the 
Privy Council has directly influenced New Zealand law. They 
will therefore be considered in detail. 
Commercial Law 
This area had the high "success" rate of 42.5%. It is 
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also notable in that it constituted such a high proportion of 
the New Zealand cases before the Board. The commercial cases 
follow the general pattern (see Table 2) as to frequency 
of appeals during the decades: most cases being heard between 
1900-1940 and 1960-1980. Interestingly, only two of the 
fifteen cases the Board has heard from New Zealand this 
decade have involved commercial law. Both appeals were 
al lowed. ( 106) 
The period to the turn of the century was very quiet, with 
the only appeal allowed: Union Bank of Australia Ltd. v -- -
Murray-Aynsley and Another, (107) being overturned on the 
basis that there was no evidence to support the conclusion 
that the bank knew a particular account was for trust funds. 
From 1900-1910 three out of six appeals were allowed. 
These cases had the effect of bringing New Zealand law into 
line with English law on an agent's authority and the 
consideration necessary to validate a contract, (108) 
legalising a seizure of goods made by the Commissioner of 
Trade and Customs, (109) and the finding that upon particular 
facts no fiduciary relation existed, nor · was fraud 
proved. (110) 
The only appeal allowed between 1910 and 1920 was Hamilton 
Gas Co Ltd. v Hamilton Borough(lll) in which the Board held 
that a statutory reference to the price of the "gasworks and 
plants" should mean the commercial value thereof as a going 
concern. The decision was reached by an examination of other 
New Zealand statutes, their principles then being applied by 
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analogy. 
The 1920's, however, saw four out of five appeals 
concerning commercial law allowed. The Court of Appeal's 
judgment in Smallfield(112) was overturned on the basis that 
there were no grounds for differing from the trial judge's 
assessment of the truth of statements which formed the life 
insurance contract. Bisset(113) was an important case as it 
clarified the test as to whether a statement is of fact or of 
opinion. The Court of Appeal was criticised in Maunder(114) 
for confusing results flowing from an invention with the 
invention itself: the appeal was allowed as the patentee in 
fact took no inventive step. A new question, without 
previous authority arose in Burnard v Lysnar(115) where the 
Board, in allowing the appeal, held that an arrangement made 
on behalf of a surety by an agent whose purported authority 
is afterwards ratified is binding upon the surety as if the 
arrangement had initially been made in that way. 
Only two commercial appeals were al lowed in the 1930' s: 
Lysnar (116) considered the issue of when the contract was 
formed; and De Buager(117) holding that an agreement made in 
London referring to "sterling" meant English currency rather 
than that of New Zealand. 
The only appeal in the 1940s, Australasian Provincial 
Assurance Association Ltd v E.T. Taylor and Co. Ltd.(118) was 
allowed on the basis that in determining the terms of the 
contract the Court of Appeal should have considered the 
parties' correspondence prior to the meeting but not their 
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subsequent actions. 
No appeals were allowed between 1950 and 1960. In 
contrast, the sixties saw four out of five appeals allowed. 
Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd. ( 119) reinforced the separate 
corporate personality of a company, holding that a governing 
director and major shareholder could become an employee of 
the company. In Farrier-Waimak Ltd(120) the Judicial 
Committee considered the respective priority positions of a 
mortgage and a lien. Previous New Zealand cases were 
approved, the Board then holding that the registered interest 
must take priority. In J.M.Construction Ltd. (121) the 
Judicial Committee differed from the Court of Appeal as to 
the inference to be drawn from the facts and held that the 
appellants had acquired the right to rebate as creditors when 
they placed their order. In Boots the Chemists(NZ} Ltd.(122) 
the Board f.ound that the United Kingdom company was not 
within the 
limitations 
business. 
bounds of 
on persons 
certain 
owning or 
New Zealand 
controlling 
statutory 
their own 
The seventies enjoyed a relatively low reversal rate; only 
two out of seven commercial cases being allowed on appeal. 
In N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd. v A.M. Satterthwaite and Co. Ltd 
( 123) the Board allowed the appeal, following the English 
cases on the privity of contract rule. Interestingly, two 
dissenting judgments were given, indicating that the question 
was far from one-sided; nonetheless the Judicial Committee 
felt justified in allowing the appeal. This area of the law 
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has since been the subject of legislative amendment in New 
Zealand - the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 now allowing third 
parties to a contract to enforce it. In Hannaford and Burton 
Ltd v Polaroid Corporation(124) the Board differed from the 
Court of Appeal as to the confusion likely to arise b~tween 
the trademarks "Polaroid" and "Solavoid", the Judicial 
Committee concluded that confusion was not, and is not in the 
future, likely to occur and therefore ordered the 
rectification of the register. The case is interesting as 
one would have thought the New Zealand court would be better 
placed to determine the validity and extent of such 
confusion, yet the Board was willing to allow the appeal 
largely on the basis of some linguistic comparisons between 
the words.(125) 
The two commercial cases on appeal before the Board were 
both allowed in 1985. The first of these was O'Connor v 
Hart ( 126) in which a decision by the Court of Appeal to 
depart from the established "English" law was promptly 
quashed by the Judicial Committee. The Board disallowed the 
Court of Appeal's attempt to set a contract aside for 
incapacity and unfairness. The most recent commercial case 
before the Board was Scancarriers A/S V Aotearoa 
International Ltd ( 127) in which the Board differed from the 
Court of Appeal as to the effect on the formation of a 
contract of two meetings and a telex. The Judicial Committee 
held that the telex was a"quote" and no more. 
Clearly, the significance of many of these cases is 
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limited to the particular statute or fact situation arising 
again. Nonetheless, the Judicial Committee has had an impact 
in the area of contract law as reflected in the decisions as 
to when the contract is formed, how the terms of the contract 
may be established and in determining the grounds on which a 
contract may be set aside. The Privy Council's influence in 
these matters is strengthened by the fact that they are 
primarily areas governed by the common law so that the 
highest judicial authority has considerable power to 
determine the way the law will develop. 
It may well be that the Judicial Committee's influence on 
the law of contract stems from a divergence in approach 
between the Board and the New Zealand courts. Berryman argues 
that the New Zealand courts place priority upon 
communitarianism values as opposed to the liberal values of 
the Privy Council, ( 128) thus suggesting that the Court of 
Appeal is more willing to interfere with a contract in order 
to achieve a II just II result. Similar 1 y, Stevens has argued 
with respect to the House of Lords that it regarded itself as 
less involved in developing contract than other areas of the 
law: ( 129) 
That much in the area of contract and commercial law was 
conservative, in the sense of restating the basic 
doctrines that had been laid down in the nineteenth 
century, must be readily admitted. 
Given that the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords are 
constituted by the same members, the methods of one will 
obviously reflect the methods of the other, thus Stevens 
observations also relate to the Judicial Committee. 
Consequently, the Board's influence on the law of contract is 
due more to different approaches rather than being strictly 
based on an abstract concept of "law" in which there is no 
room for discretion. 
Apart from the area of contract, few of the Judicial 
Committee's opinions concerning commercial law have wide 
application. Exceptions to this are Bisset, (130) which helps 
define the test for misrepresentation; Lee(131), giving 
credence to the separate legal identity of a company from its 
directors; and Farrier-Waimak, ( 132) in clarifying the 
priority position between a mortgage and a lien. 
The effect of the Privy Council on the development of New 
Zealand commercial law can therefore be seen to be limited. 
It has not had a pervasive effect but rather has, while 
influencing the law of contract, only had a minor and 
sporadic effect in other areas. Such a conclusion is 
particularly important when assessing the impact the Privy 
Council has had on New Zealand law generally as so many of 
the appeals to the Board have involved an issue of commercial 
law ( 38. 4%) . Therefore, as the Board has not had a great 
effect on the development of law in the commercial area, its 
influence upon New Zealand law generally will also be small. 
Trusts and Wills 
This area of the law has also had a very high reversal 
rate: 47%. Probably its most distinguishing characteristic 
is that, while appeals were heard regularly, if not 
frequently, until the middle of this century - two or three 
appeals were heard by the Board in this area of law each 
decade there has only been one appeal since 1944. ( 133) 
Thus, any conclusions made as to the effect of the Judicial 
Committee in this area of the law wi 11 reflect on its past 
influence rather than its current effect. The only exception 
to this lies with cases in which the appeal was allowed many 
years ago but the decision is still relied upon today. 
The Privy Council has heard four cases on appeal from New 
Zealand which are concerned with trusts. The judgment which 
is the most far-reaching,both in this area and that of public 
law is that of Wallis v Solicitor-General(134). While 
aspects of the case will be dealt with later(135), the case 
is of some importance to the law of trusts in the way it 
explains how to recognise a charitable trust and the 
obligations the Solicitor-General is placed under by the 
doctrine of cy-pres. While the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
had to be corrected on these matters, this was not so much 
because it did not understand them but rather because the 
Court's whole attitude to the case appears to have been 
rather biased in favour of the Crown. Consequently, the 
general effect this decision had on the law of trusts in New 
Zealand is limited. 
In Wright v Morgan(136) the Judicial Committee affirmed 
the Court of Appeal's dee is ion in the main, but varied it 
both with respect to the classification of stock on the 
grounds that it represented not the sale of a business but of 
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individual sheep and cattle, and in that part of the land 
which the Court of Appeal had treated in the same way as the 
rest of the land, was excluded from the inquiry. The case of 
Barton v Moorhouse ( 137) involved the interpretation of a 
private Act designed to give effect to a trust stipulated in 
a will concerning dispositions of land. The Judicial 
Committee differed from the Court of Appeal and the judgment 
was varied accordingly. However, the judgment involved 
tenants in tail which are no longer a part of New Zealand law 
and so the influence this decision may have had is 
negligible. 
The Privy Council's effect on the law relat i ng to trusts 
in New Zealand can thus be seen to be minimal both in 
quantity and applicable substantive law. 
Four of the eleven appeals dealing with wills were allowed 
by the Board. Rhodes v Rhodes ( 138) laid down some of the 
basic principles for construing the terms of a will. In this 
case, their Lordships applied the leading English cases with 
the result that the will was interpreted to avoid absurdity 
and incongruity even though this may have been the plain 
ordinary meaning of the words used. It was also made clear 
that the Court must, in construing the will, take the words 
as it finds them, without considering any difference between 
the words intended to be used by the testator and those which 
are bona fide used by the person who draws up the will. 
The case of Tarbutt v Nicholson and Long(139) was 
dependent upon the construction of a particular clause in the 
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will. Their Lordships differed from the Court of Appeal in 
that they were unable to find any reason for giving the 
statement a restrictive meaning. Instead a literal 
interpretation was placed upon the clause. 
The case of in re Macleay(deceased), Macleay v Treadwell 
( 140) turned on the identity of the testator's "heir-at-
law". The decision of the Judicial Committee differed from 
that of the Court of Appeal in the effect that was attributed 
to the Administration Act 1879, i.e the old "heir-at-law was 
found to remain as an existing personage in New Zealand law. 
In finding thus, the Board criticised Australian judgments on 
the effect of similar legislation. 
Dillon v Public Trustee(141) had the potential to be a 
major influence on New Zealand law: the Judicial Committee 
held that a disposition of property authorised by the Family 
Protection Act 1908 would override a contract which was for 
valuable consideration to make a will in stipulated terms. 
While this case appears to be wide-reaching in its effect, it 
has not in fact been so. This is due to a conflicting Privy 
Council decision on the same issue: Schaeffer v 
Schuhmann( 142) in which the Board, in considering an appeal 
from New South Wales, impliedly reversed Dillon. In 1982 the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in Breuer v Wright(143) was faced 
directly with the problem of whether to follow Dillon - on 
appeal from New Zealand - or Schuhmann - the more recent 
case. The Court decided to follow Schuhmann. Thus, while 
Dillon had great potential to influence New Zealand law, it 
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did not live up to its expectations. 
In the case of Sidney v Perpetual Trustees, Estate and 
Agency Co of New Zealand Ltd. ( 144) the issue was as to the 
correct division of the estate upon the construction of the 
will. The appeal was allowed, the Judicial Committee 
believing that there was only one viable interpretation of 
the will. 
The case of the widest applicability is Rhodes. (145) 
The other cases are too specifically related to the terms of 
the will they seek to interpret to have much general 
influence on the law of succession. However, while Rhodes was 
no doubt influential in the years immediately following it, 
it has little effect on New Zealand law today. Consequently, 
one can say that the Judicial Committee has had a very 
limited effect on the law of succession in the past but that 
it currently has no such influence in this area. 
Public Law 
It should be noted that the term "public" law has been 
used in this paper to include constitutional and 
administrative law. Surprisingly, public law has the highest 
reversal rate of all - out of eighteen appeals in this area, 
ten were allowed, giving a "success" rate of 56%. It is 
interesting to compare such a figure with a statement by Beth 
after she had separated the Canadian and Australian Privy 
Council appeal 
headings: ( 146) 
cases into various subject group 
While the reversal rate is surprisingly high in each 
category, it is lower in the two areas of constitutional 
and public law, in which one would expect British courts 
to defer to the judgment of legislatures, and it is 
highest for those in which the Committee exercises a 
supervisory function over the lower courts. 
It appears that the Board has not been as reticent in 
interfering with the area of public law in New Zealand as one 
would expect from a study such as Beth's of other 
jurisdictions which are also subject to the Privy Council. 
Interestingly, the flow of appeals to the Judicial Committee 
has by no means been regular. Instead, most cases were heard 
before their Lordships in the periods 1890-1905 and 1980-
1986. The rest of the time appeals before the Board have 
averaged at a rate of approximately one each decade . The two 
periods when appeals have been frequent both lead to 
controversy as to the proper place in New Zealand for the 
Judicial Committee. In the early period the outlet of 
pressure was the Protest of Bench and Bar(147) delivered by 
the court of Appeal in response to the Board's decision in 
Wallis and Others v Solicitor-General . (148) In the eighties 
the controversy has sparked off much academic writing 
concerning both specific decisions of the Judicial Committee 
and the place of such an institution in New Zealand's future. 
It is in such periods that some of the most wide-reaching 
decisions have been given. 
A country's constitutional independence and its claim to 
sovereignty are inextricably linked. Therefore, when the 
Judicial Committee allows an appeal of a constitutional 
issue, the effect on New Zealand's sovereignty is immediate. 
Consequently, the link between the appeals which have been 
allowed in the public law area this decade, and the fact that 
the appeal to the Privy Council is about to be abolished 
cannot be underestimated. Prima facie, the greatest 
influence the Judicial Committee has had on New Zealand law 
appears to be in the public law field. 
An important aspect of the Privy Council's effect on New 
Zealand law is the way it has been able to protect Maori 
rights. At times the local courts have seemingly been 
willing to construe the law in a manner which fails to 
recognise such rights and it has taken the interference of an 
independent body such as the Judicial Committee to rectify 
the situation. Interestingly, it has been argued that the 
Board's protection of minority rights has also been notable 
in respect of Catholics in Quebec and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland.(149) While the protection of minorities has clearly 
been a role of constitutional safeguard which the Board was 
able to perform in the early days of the colony, it has not 
done so for many years. Nonetheless its absence in this area 
has not been missed now that the New Zealand courts appear to 
be sufficiently independent to give judgments which are not 
biased against the minority interest. Given the Board's 
historical protection of native rights, there may currently 
be some who favour retention of the appeal until the Treaty 
of Waitangi issues are resolved. 
The first appeal of a public law issue which the Judicial 
Committee heard and allowed from New Zealand was The Queen v 
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Clarke ( 150) in which a grant of land made by the Governor 
General was declared void as it was contrary to the terms of 
the Ordinance upon which it was claimed to be founded. While 
this decision is obviously limited in its application to the 
particular Ordinance 
of land, and their 
issue at the time, 
in question, the issue of Crown grants 
subsequent validity, was an important 
therefore the ef feet of this decision 
should not be underestimated. 
The case of Buckley v Edwards(151) held that the governor 
can only appoint Supreme Court judges when an ascertainable 
salary is payable by law. This was on the assumption that 
unless the legislature had made such provisions the position 
did not really exist: the appointment in question was 
subsequently declared invalid. 
In Nireaha Tamaki v Baker ( 152) the Judicial Committee 
affirmed the customary title to land of the Maori. The Board 
pointed to legislative recognition of such title and held 
that the New Zealand courts were bound to take account of it. 
The earlier Court of Appeal decision of Wi Parata v Bishop 
of Wellington(153) was criticised for its dicta that there is 
no customary law of the Maoris of which the Courts of law can 
take cognizance. Nireaha Tamaki was thus a sharp reminder to 
the Courts of New Zealand that they must recognise Maori 
customary title. However, it was a 11 reminder 11 which was 
largely ignored until relatively recently. This case thus 
illustrates the limitations upon the Judicial Committee's 
ability to protect rights or have a significant impact on the 
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development of the law within a country subject to its 
jurisdiction, as while it may make an important decision in a 
particular case, where the local courts avoid the 
implications of the case by distinguishing it, the Board can 
have no further influence on the matter until an appeal on 
the same issue is once again before it. Given the infrequent 
rate of appeals this often means that the impact of a 
decision of the Board's is limited to the interpretation the 
local courts are prepared to allow it. Consequently, due to 
the attitude of the New Zealand courts, the decision of 
Nireaha Tamaki(154) did not have such a significant impact as 
one would expect it to have had. 
Wallis v Solicitor-General(155) was another case in which 
the Judicial Committee expressed considerable concern at the 
treatment by the Crown of the Maori and the subsequent 
support given to the Crown by the local courts. The Board 
found that there was no evidence whatsoever pointing to any 
cession to the Crown. On the relationship between the 
Executive, Legislature and Courts the Board commented: (156) 
The proposition advanced on behalf of the Crown is 
certainly not flattering to the dignity or independence of 
the highest Court in New Zealand or even to the 
intelligence of the Parliament. What has the Court to do 
with the Executive? Where there is a suit properly 
constituted and ripe for decision, why should justice be 
denied or delayed at the bidding of the 
Executive? .... Surely it is for the Court, not for the 
Executive, to determine what is a breach of trust ... why 
should it be suggested that Parliament will act better if 
it acts in the dark and without al lowing the Court to 
declare and define the rights with which it may be asked 
to deal? 
Such statements in Wallis were not taken lightly by 
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members of the New Zealand judiciary who shortly thereafter 
expressed their concern as to the future appropriateness of 
the Judicial Committee as the final appellate court for New 
Zealand: (157) 
That Court, by its imputations in the present case, by 
the ignorance it has shown in this and other cases of our 
history, of our legislation, and of our practice, and by 
its long-delayed judgments, has displayed every 
characteristic of an alien tribunal. 
A contrary interpretation has been argued for by 
McHugh,(158) who claims that in Wallis the Privy Council was 
better attuned to the local circumstances and the Imperial 
ideal than the colonial bar. Wallis is clearly an important 
case for New Zealand's constitutional development, if not 
because of the decision itself, then because of the reaction 
it provoked. 
The next few appeals allowed by the Board in the public 
law area are of significantly less importance. In Smith V 
McArthur(159) the Board applied section 5(7) of the New 
Zealand Interpretation Act 13~8 and consequently a liberal 
interpretation was given to the Alcoholic Liquors Sale 
Control Act Amendment Act 1895 in order to give effect to the 
object of the legislature . The Licensing Committee was 
thereby given jurisdiction to hear the appellant's 
application for renewal. Graham v Callaghan (160) held that 
following the repeal of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1893, 
every Magistrate was a Magistrate throughout New Zealand and 
that subsequently all separate local jurisdiction had been 
abolished in the Magistrates' Court. 
The fol lowing two cases were dismissed on appeal to the 
Privy Council. They are mentioned because of their 
importance to New Zealand's constitutional law rather than as 
indicative of the effect the Board has had. In Auckland 
Harbour Board v The King(161) the Judicial Committee held 
that the New Zealand Constitution inherits the British 
constitutional principle that public moneys cannot officially 
be spent without a "distinct authorisation" from the New 
Zealand Parliament. In the case of Te Heuheu Tukino v 
Aotea District Maori Land Board(162) a law changing the 
status of Maori lands which were protected by the Treaty of 
Waitangi was upheld. The Board held that the courts cannot 
enforce treaty rights and that despite the Treaty, the New 
Zealand legislature had the same power to change native land 
law as the British parliament would have had. 
The appeal in Auckland Electric Power Board v Public 
Trustee(163) was allowed, the Judicial Committee finding 
that the regulations in question were ultra vires. In Jeffs 
v NZ Dairy Product ion and Marketing Board ( 164) the Judie ial 
Committee differed from the Court of Appeal majori t y, instead 
holding that the Dairy Board had failed to discharge its duty 
to hear interested parties before deciding on zoning 
applications. The decision has been the subject of some 
criticism(165) in that it failed to indicate what rules it 
was applying, thereby severely limiting its future precedent 
value. 
The 1980s have been a period of turmoil with respect to 
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the Privy Council's influence upon New Zealand public law. 
In the case of Lesa v Attorney General ( 166) the Judicial 
Committee came to the surprising conclusion that the 
plaintiff, a Western Samoan woman born in 1946, was a New 
Zealand citizen. This decision caused considerable 
controversy in academic spheres as well as providing an 
administrative dilemma for both the New Zealand and the 
Western Samoan governments. The practical solution reached is 
found in the Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act 1982 which was 
arrived at after consultation between the governments. The 
absurdity of Western Samoans suddenly being declared New 
Zealand citizens as the result of an Act passed in 1928(167) 
does not need further elucidation. The case was not given 
detailed examination by the Court of Appeal as it had fully 
considered the issue as recently as 1979 in Levave (168) and 
was content to follow that case. The Board , however, was 
convinced by an argument advanced before it which had been 
considered in Levave . In light of the apparently little 
emphasis placed upon the argument by counsel for the 
appellant one must wonder as to the way in which the Privy 
Council approached the case: (169) 
This argument , of which the appellant's written case to 
this Board gave no forewarning, emerged for the first time 
in the closing stages of the appellant's counsel's opening 
speech. 
However, their Lordships were convinced of the argument, 
leaving New Zealand in a rather odd predicament. Despite the 
Board's view of the inescapability of its conclusion, many 
others have found it highly questionnable . The primary 
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objective to the decision is that it was disposed of on a 
narrow point of construction without regard to the 
considerable constitutional and legal ramifications to which 
it lead. (170) The Judicial Committee's decision in Lesa v 
Attorney-General has been responsible for much of the current 
discussion as to the appropriateness of the Board as the 
final appellate court for New Zealand. However, the 
decision's effect on New Zealand law was limited by the 
intervention of the legislature 
was neither welcome nor accepted. 
as it was an effect which 
The case of Re Ere bus Royal Commission; Air New Zealand -- --
Ltd. v Mahon(171) is interesting as a reflection of the Privy 
Council's attitude. The Judicial Committee sought to avoid 
the impression that it was interfering in an area of law 
which was the domain of the New Zealand courts:(172) 
Their Lordship's consideration of the reports of cases 
from New Zealand, England and other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions that have been helpfully included in the 
documents provided for them by the parties to this appeal 
does not leave them in any doubt that the principles 
underlying the exercise of judicial review in New Zealand 
and in England, at any rate, are the same. But the 
machinery and practices by which governmental power, 
central or local, is exercised to control or otherwise to 
affect the activities of private citizens in the two 
countries are not identical; and the detailed application 
in New Zealand of the principles of judicial review to 
particular indigenous kinds of administrative act ion is, 
in their Lordships' view, best left to the New Zealand 
Courts without obtrusion by this Board where such a course 
is not essential to enable an appeal to be disposed of by 
her Majesty in Council. 
Such a view is, however, inconsistent with the approach 
that the Board must intervene in order to keep the law in a 
uniform state throughout the Commonwealth. This alternative 
approach is evidenced, for example, by Hart v O'Connor.(173) 
Such discrepancy in approaches has been one of the more 
frustrating aspects of the right of appeal in recent years as 
in some cases the Board has deliberately avoided altering the 
decision of the Court of Appeal, while in others it has not 
hesitated to allow the appeal by realigning the law of New 
Zealand with that of England. The frustration stems not only 
from such action by the Board but from the seemingly random 
methods the Board appears to use when intervening or 
refraining from such activity. 
While the appeal in Re Erebus Royal Commission was 
dismissed, the case is still significant for the general 
development of the law of judicial control because of the 
emphasis the Judicial Committee gave to what it saw as a lack 
of probative evid·ence underlying the Royal Commission's 
finding. The Board's categorisation of probative evidence as 
a ground for review is potentially a major new development 
for the rules of natural just ice. ( 174) This case is thus 
illustrative of the fact that the Board's influence is not 
limited to cases in which the appeal is allowed. 
The dismissal of the appeal is also interesting in that it 
gave credence to the impartiality of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal. Cases involving areas of such widespread national 
interest are rare, as are cases in which the independence of 
the Court of Appeal is challenged by the public. 
Nonetheless, Air New Zealand Ltd. v Mahon(175) had both these 
elements within it and the New Zealand judicial system 
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benefited from the Judicial Committee's affirmation of the 
local court's decision. 
The most recent case the Board has considered, and in 
which the appeal was allowed, is Rowling and the Attorney-
General v Takaro Properties Ltd. (176) The Court of Appeal had 
held that the Minister owed a duty of care to Takaro 
Properties which he had breached by taking insufficient care 
in deciding upon the company's application to invest within 
New Zealand. (177) However, the Judicial Committee agreed 
with little that the Court of Appeal had decided. Instead 
they held that the Minister was not negligent on the facts 
and, while not deciding the issue conclusively, they had real 
doubts as to whether a duty existed at al 1. The approach 
taken by the Court of Appeal was highly criticised by the 
Judicial Committee, particularly in the course of the 
argument. Such critic ism has not been taken lightly by the 
Court of Appeal who have speculated as to the underlying 
reasons for the Board's attitude. The President of that 
Court has suggested that the Judicial Committee reached its 
decision as a result of thei-r Lordships' background rather 
than through an evaluation of the merits of the case: (178) 
The inference is hard to resist that the idea that a 
Cabinet Minister may be under a duty of care to persons 
with whose applications he has to deal, with liability in 
damages for failure to exercise reasonable care, has nil 
attractions for some lawyers, even very eminent lawyers, 
of a certain background or cast of mind. It seems to be 
an idea provocative enough to lead to departures from 
ordinary judicial standards. 
Such allegations demonstrate the widening gap between the 
Judicial Committee and the local courts. While different 
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perspectives of cases are to be expected from appellate 
courts, speculation that this is due in part to the ranking 
in society of the judiciary (ie. their class) is obviously a 
sign of deep discontent with the final appellate body. 
The area of public law has seen some of the most 
controversial appeals allowed by the Board. In the early 
years of the Board's jurisdiction to New Zealand some of its 
decisions were of primary importance in their recognition of 
Maori customary title. However, the effect of such decisions 
was limited by their treatment within the New Zealand legal 
system. The Judicial Committee's role as "protector" of the 
Native interest is no longer a major one - a question in this 
area not having arisen before the Board since 1941. 
Presumably this is because cases are now being heard by a 
Court of Appeal which has not pre-determined the issue in a 
manner contrary to the Maori 
courts have developed their 
interest. As the New Zealand 
independence, appeals to the 
Judicial Commi tttee have become unnecessary as a means to 
protect minorities. Subsequently, it can be stated that the 
Board played a role in the ear 1 y days of the colony in 
protecting Maori rights but that its influence in this area 
has neither been sought nor missed in more recent years. 
The case of Lesa v Attorney-General(179} obviously had the 
potential to be a major effect on public law in New Zealand 
although because of the way the government of the day chose 
to deal with the decision - by negotiating with the Western 
Samoan Government and the subsequent enactment of 
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legislation-the effect was shortlived. Nonetheless, it was a 
particularly significant case both in its legal and political 
effect. Similarly, Takara Properties Ltd. (180) is also a 
recent decision with wide ramifications. The scope of a duty 
placed upon a Minister is of considerable importance in the 
day-to-day running of a nation, the Judicial Committee's 
interpretation of such a duty and the standard it required 
giving members of the Executive a wider discretion than the 
Court of Appeal was prepared to. 
It is thus clear that while some individual decisions of 
the Board have had a major influence on the development of 
New Zealand public law, the majority have not been of 
widespread application. Nonetheless, it is in this area that 
the Judicial Committee has had the greatest effect. Public 
law is not an area in which the Board appears to have had 
less effect as time has passed as evidenced by the decisions 
of consequence in the past ten years. It is in this area 
that the Judicial Committee's influence has the greatest 
potential to allow appeals of a nature which are derogatory 
to New Zealand's sovereignty. Indeed, this has already 
happened. Furthermore, the current "trend" displayed by the 
Board indicates that the area of public law will continue to 
be one in which the Board's influence will be strongly felt. 
Criminal Law 
The appeals before the Board on matters of a criminal 
nature have already been substantially discussed. ( 181) 
Suffice it to say that the appeal rate is low (25%) and that 
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while most of the cases in the area are recent, the Board has 
also of late turned down a relatively large number of 
applications for leave to appeal thereby indicating that 
rather than being more willing to hear criminal cases it is 
instead being asked to do so more regularly. Therefore it 
may still be hearing the same small proportion of cases in 
which leave is requested. The Judicial Committee has not had 
a great effect in this area upon New Zealand law. Of the two 
appeals that were allowed,(182) one was decided by the Court 
of Appeal on the f oat ing that it was bound by an ear 1 ier 
decision of its own. As the Court appears to have reassessed 
its position on the matter of stare decisis(183) the need 
for a further appeal to escape the limitations of an earlier 
decision no longer appears to be necessary. Nonetheless, 
even that decision was based upon a very limited area of the 
law ( the meaning of "frequents" in the Police Offences Act 
1927). The only other appeal which was allowed was done so on 
the basis that the Crown had failed to prove a monopoly which 
was contrary to the public interest. 
Consequently the direct influence the Judicial Committee has 
had on the development of New Zealand's criminal law is 
negligible. 
The Law of Torts -----
The area of tort law has a surprisingly low reversal rate 
of 25%. This is surprising because of the extent to which 
this area is dominated by the common law which it is, of 
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course, the duty of the courts to declare. The number of 
appeals heard by the Judicial Committee in this area is also 
surprisingly low for the same reason: one would have 
expected a larger number of appeals in an area dependent upon 
the common law. 
A possible reason for this may have been a consistency in 
approach shared by both the Judicial Committee and the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal . Stevens indicates that the House of 
Lords was willing to assume a far greater responsibility for 
remolding doctrine in the law of tort compared to that of 
contract.(184) That the New Zealand courts have been 
similarly inclined to develop rather than restrict 
development of the law in this area is indicated by their 
acceptance of the test to establish a duty found in Anns . 
( 184) Thus the fact that both the Board and the Court of 
Appeal were intent on developing the law may account for the 
low reversal rate in this area. 
The frequency of appeals is regularly spread t hroughout 
the period in which appeals have been available. 
Of the appeals which were allowed in this area of law, few 
are of any general significance. In Black v Christchurch 
Finance Co. Ltd. (186) their Lordships differed with the Court 
of Appeal on the interpretation to be placed upon the terms 
of a contract between an owner of land and an independent 
contractor. The owner was held to be vicariously liable for 
the burning of bush upon his land by the latter even though 
the independent contractor had violated the terms of his 
contract. 
In 
Board 
Lyttleton 
held that 
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Times Company Ltd 
as neither party 
v Warners 
had done 
Ltd(187) 
anything 
the 
not 
contemplated by an agreement between the parties and as 
negligent construction of the building had not been 
established, an action did not lie in nuisance for the 
construction of a building which resulted in a noise level 
unsatisfactory to the respondent. 
In Stewart v Hancock ( 188) the Board al lowed the appeal, 
holding that the jury could reasonably have come to their 
conclusion that the defendent had been negligent. The case 
is heavily dependent upon its facts. 
The only case of general importance to the law of torts is 
therefore Rowling v Takoro Properties Ltd(189). While this 
has already been discussed to some extent in connection with 
its impact on public law, not all relevant points have been 
made. One of the concerning aspects of the case is its 
retreat from the more general test for when a duty lies as 
found in Anns(190). Placing limitations upon the founding of 
a duty is indicative of a policy reversal by the English 
courts in the area of negligence. Such a backward step is of 
great consequence to the law of torts especially when it is a 
step that the New Zealand courts are reluctant to take. More 
specifically, the dicta as to the duty owed by Ministers of 
the Crown and their Lordships' observations as to damage: the 
only consequence of the Minister's actions in this case 
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reputedly being delay, will have a direct effect on the level 
of accountabi 1 i ty which can be placed on a Minister. The 
case represents an area of law in which the New Zealand 
courts sought to continue the developing role of the common 
law whereas the Board was intent on retracing its steps from 
the wider definition of duty which it had previously 
espoused. 
In summary, the Judicial Committee's influence on the law 
of torts is confined to the effects resulting from the Takara 
( 191) case as the other appeals which the Board allowed are 
not of general applicability due to the extent to which they 
are dependent upon the facts at issue. While Takara 
Properties Ltd. was itself decided upon its facts in that the 
Minister was found not to have breached a duty, if he did in 
fact owe one; it is nevertheless signficant due to the obiter 
as to the application of Anns. Clearly the Privy Council has 
had an extremely limited effect on the development of the law 
of torts in New Zealand. 
The Law of Taxation 
The Judicial Committee's effect on the law of taxation in 
New Zealand has been surprisingly widespread. It is 
surprising as the reversal rate in this area is relatively 
"normal" (35%). The reason for this result can be attributed 
to the fact that, of the appeals which the Board has allowed, 
a number have concerned matters of general importance to the 
assessment of taxation. 
Appeals in this area of law have traditionally been 
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relatively infrequent, though regular. An exception to this 
is the period of the 1970's when a comparatively large number 
of cases were heard by the Board ( seven out of a total of 
twenty-three). 
The earliest appeal allowed by the Judicial Committee was 
Dilworth v Commissioner of Stamps ( 192) in which the issue 
revolved around whether a bequest to a public school was for 
charity: their Lordships held that it was and there was 
therefore no tax imposed. Lovell and Christmas Ltd. (193) 
concerned the question of whether profits arising from 
arrangements made in New Zealand to sell goods on commission 
in London were "derived from" New Zealand so that they were 
taxable as source income. Their Lordships held that there 
was not a sufficient nexus between the source of the 
arrangements and the profits. In commenting on the English 
and New Zealand Income Tax Acts the · Board noted that they 
were not identical but believed there was sufficient 
similarity to make English decisions authoritative. Such 
consideration of English cases has been a common means of 
deciding whether to allow an appeal in this area of law. 
The case of Doughty v Commissioner of Taxes(194) held that 
upon the reconstitution of a partnership into a company a 
notional book profit that resulted was not taxable. Their 
Lordships advised that the company could not increase the 
value of the assets merely by overestimating them. Attention 
was also given to the distinction between capital 
sales and sales producing income: this is an area of some 
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complexity in which the Board's obiter would have a long-term 
effect. 
In Finch v Commissioner of Stamp Duties ( 195) the Judicial 
Committee held that a husband's monetary contributions to 
repairs for a house owned by his wife were not a "gift" and 
therefore caught by the provisions of the Death Duties Act 
1921. 
The next appeal which the Board allowed was the first of 
the controversial Europa(196) cases. In this case, the Board 
held that section 111 of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954 
required the court not merely to tax the respondent on the 
economic business character of the transactions but to 
ascertain for what the expenditure was really incurred. It 
was therefore held that the advantage gained from the profits 
derived through Pan-Eastern were taxable despite Europa's 
claim that they were merely an incidental, uncovenanted 
advantage for which it had not given consideration. The 
majority of their Lordships' thus based their test on the 
practical effect of the transactions rather than the legal 
form they took. Interestingly, a dissenting judgment was 
given by two members of the Judicial Committee agreeing with 
the conclusions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. If this 
were the end of the matter the case could be dismissed merely 
as an example in which the Board had come to a different 
conclusion to the local court on a matter of some importance. 
However, in 1976 Europa again brought an appeal before the 
Judicial Committee.(197) The appeal was argued on the same 
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facts although contracts which had been considered 
insignificant in the earlier case were now relied upon to 
distinguish it. The appeal concerned a new liability arising 
from different tax years. The Court of Appeal, not 
surprisingly, followed Europa No. 1, and held that as the 
real effect of the agreement had a collateral advantage then 
the profits of such an advantage were taxable. However, the 
Judicial Committee allowed the appeal. Interestingly, Lord 
Wilberforce, who had given their Lordships' opinion in Europa 
No. 1 dissented from the majority judgment in Europa No. ~-
His dissent is perhaps the only element of consistency 
between the cases. His opinion was clear: (198) 
.... the present case ought to be decided on the basis of the interpretation adopted by the Board in the 1970 appeal, as the Courts in New Zealand have considered. 
It was not, however, shared by the majority of the Board. 
Instead, the earlier decision was "explained": (199) 
Read in this context it becomes clear that the reference to "reality" was directed only to the legal character of the payment and not to its economic consequences. 
Despite the Board's claim that the test has always been that 
it is the legal rights enforceable by the taxpayer that he or 
she acquires in return for the expenditure which is 
determinative of whether the expenditure is deductible or 
not, this is certainly not clear from Europa No.1. (200) 
Ignoring the rights and wrongs of the test to be applied, the 
Judicial Committee's treatment of these two cases was 
somewhat disturbing. Whatever may be said about the merits of 
allowing the first appeal, to also allow the second when the 
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Court of Appeal had reached their conclusion by follo.wing the 
Privy Council's decision of a mere five years earlier was 
insulting and frustrating to the local Courts. As Sir 
Thaddeus McCarthy put it: (201) 
Then, in Europa, I would think that there can be little 
doubt that the Board came to a somewhat belated view that 
we were right on the first, the earlier, appeal, though 
for obvious reasons they did not find it necessary to say 
so. 
As to the tests the cases considered, the grounds for 
determining whether expenditure is deductible clearly 
constitutes an important area of the law. Consequently, the 
effect of the Board's decisions as to the applicable test has 
had a considerable bearing on New Zealand tax law. 
Between the two Europa cases, another appeal of 
significance was allowed. In Holden v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue(202), which was heard concurrently with 
Menneer, (203) the Board held, affirming the Court of Appeal, 
that in determining whether property was acquired for the 
purpose of sale within S88 ( 1) ( C} of the Land and Income Tax 
Act 1954 the test is for what purpose was the property 
acquired, and, if there was more than one purpose, what was 
the dominant purpose. The appeal was allowed on the basis 
that no profit had been made on the sale of the securities 
even though they may have been sold for another , lesser, 
value. 
The most recent appeal allowed by the Board is 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd. 
(204). This case concerned the distinction between tax 
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avoidance and mitigation. An examination of sections 99, 188 
and 191 of the Income Tax Act 1976 lead the Board to the 
conclusion that the agreement into which Challenge had 
entered was one of tax avoidance which was void against the 
Commissioner. The Court of Appeal had held to the contrary 
and were supported by a dissenting judgment of Lord Oliver of 
Aylmerton: ( 205) 
For my part, I am driven to the same conclusion as that 
reached by the majority of the Court of Appeal, namely 
that the only possible reconciliation of sections 99 and 
191 is to treat the latter as providing the code for group 
taxation and one which contains its own exhaustive anti-
avoidance provisions, so that section 99 falls to be read 
as subject to a limitation that it does not avoid a 
transaction authorised in terms by Section 191. 
The different implications from the differing 
interpretations of the statute are of central importance to 
the law of taxation. Much argument was raised both in the 
Court of Appeal and before the Board as to the disturbing 
consequences which would arise if the statute was read in the 
way the appellant advocated. However, the Judicial Committee 
put aside such concerns and gave effect to those very 
arguments. The Board's distinct ion between the mitigation 
and the avoidance of income tax is difficult to follow. Its 
application to Challenge Corporation Ltd . meant that the 
company could not deduct a loss of $5. 8 million which had 
been sustained by an expenditure of $10,000 in purchasing the 
shares of Perth. However, the Judie ial Commit tee did not 
consider that the expenditure was incurred in circumstances 
in which the taxing statute afforded a reduction in tax 
liability because of their conclusion that section 191 
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should be read subject to section 99. This is an important 
case as the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
mitigation is essential for successful taxation planning. 
The Judicial Committee's decision has been criticised both on 
the grounds that its interpretation of the Income Tax Act 
1956 is not what Parliament intended and that its decision 
has lead to uncertainty as to the appropriate and legitimate 
means of tax mitigation. 
Stevens argues that the area of tax law demonstrated the 
most extreme example of the House of Lords' retreat from 
substantive formalism: (207) 
By the mid 1960's the situation had changed noticeably. 
Led by Reid, whose own views apparently had been 
modified, the House had come to read tax legislation like 
other legislation - and while still chary of taxing by 
analogy, the law lords sought the meaning of the tax 
provisions by looking to the whole purpose of the section 
or the act, rather than at the actual words used. 
Following this approach the House has become particularly 
prominent in the development of the law of taxation, 
especially as there is not a general anti-avoidance provision 
in the English legislation. However appropriate such a method 
may be for England, the New Zealand legislation is clearly 
different and as such requires a different method of 
interpretation. The New Zealand legislature had addressed 
the question of a general anti-avoidance provision so that 
the courts~ role should have been limited to applying the 
normal principles of statutory interpretation rather than 
interfering to achieve a result which the court considered 
just. However, in Challenge(208) the majority were so 
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determined to prevent what they perceived as the exploitation 
of the group loss relief provisions of section 191 that they 
were prepared to disregard the general principle of statutory 
interpretation which allows a general rule to overrule a 
specific rule of direct applicability to the facts. As 
Professor Willoughby puts it: (209) 
... the Challenge case emphasises the 
basic principles of interpretation of 
to the primary responsibility of the 
the law right one might add 
inappropriate for the courts to treat 
moral issue and to seek to repair 
parliament. 
need to return to 
taxing statutes and 
legislature to get 
that it is also 
tax avoidance as a 
the mistakes of 
Despite the area of taxation being one which is determined 
by statute, the interpretation of the various provisions has 
given the courts wide scope for influencing the direction the 
law has taken. The appeals which the Board has allowed have 
concerned issues of wide appl icabi 1 i ty: source income, the 
treatment of notional book profits, the test as to whether 
expenditure is deductible, and the basis for distinguishing 
between tax avoidance and tax mitigation. While the Board 
has not always assisted the consistent development of the 
law, as illustrated by the Europa (210) cases, it has 
nevertheless had an important influence on this area of the 
law. 
Land and Lease 
The Judicial Committee's influence on the development of 
land law and the law pertaining to leases has been minimal. 
Out of 26 cases in this area, only six( 23%) of the appeals 
were allowed. Most appeals heard by the Board were at the 
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end of last century and the early years of the 1900s. In 
fact only one appeal has been allowed since 1926. It thus 
appears that any immediate effect the Board's decisions may 
have had is clearly over and that even if their Lordships did 
influence the early land law of New Zealand they have not had 
a significant impact in the last fifty years. 
The earliest appeal allowed by the Board was Plimmer v 
Wellington City Corporation(211) in 1884. The Judicial 
Committee held that the equitable and indefinite right to the 
jetty which had been acquired was an interest in land for 
which compensation was payable. The case does not involve 
principles of general application although it was a source of 
some frustration to the Court of Appeal as indicated by their 
comments upon it in the Protest of Bench and Bar. (212) 
In Eccles v Mills(213) the Board differed from the Court 
of Appeal on the effect of a declaration following a lease 
covenant. It was held that the covenant was qualified by the 
declaration and that the liability for its breach was to be 
borne by the testators general estate as it was not 
incidental to the relationship of landlord and tenant. The 
case was dependent upon the terms of the agreement in 
question. 
The most important appeal allowed in this area was Assets 
Co. Ltd. v Mere Roihi(214). This case confirmed that "fraud" 
within the Land Transfer Act, means actual fraud, requiring 
dishonesty of 
fraud were 
some sort and that constructive 
not covered by the statute. 
or equitable 
The case 
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distinguished Gibbs v Messer(215): a previous Privy Council 
case on appeal from Australia, thereby limiting the doctrine 
as to fraud and forgery which it had been taken as laying 
down. It was held that the Land Transfer Acts 1~~0-1895 and 
the Native Lands Act showed that documents giving title could 
be assumed to have been properly obtained, and could be 
safely acted upon by the District Land Registrar and by other 
persons acting in good faith. This lead the Judicial 
Committee to the conclusion that as the agents of the 
appellants had registered documents which according to their 
purport and effect entitled, and which they bona fide 
believed did entitle, the appellants to be registered as 
owners, there was no fraud and the registered title of the 
appellants was therefore decisive. This case has therefore 
had important ramifications both with respect to when fraud 
affects title and in support of the indefeasibility of title 
concept which is central to the Torrens system of 
registration. 
In Greville v Parker(216) the Board held that the Court of 
Appeal had misconstrued the extent of its power under Section 
94 of the Property Law Act 1908, as it did not enable the 
Court to give relief against failure to perform a condition 
precedent to the lessee's right to a renewed lease. The case 
of Gardner v Hirawanu(217) was allowed due to the differing 
interpretations of a covenant in a lease that the lessee was 
to cultivate the land. The Judicial Committee held that this 
extended beyond the grant of a right and created an 
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obligation in the lessee to clear the land. 
Farr ier-Waimak Ltd. v Bank of New Zealand ( 218) saw the 
Board examine the respective priorities to be given to a 
mortgage and a contractor's lien. It was held that whichever 
was first registered would have priority, thus reinforcing 
the emphasis of New Zealand land law upon registration. 
It is thus clear that the only appeal which was allowed 
which is of general importance is Assets Co. Ltd(219). 
However, because of the way in which the decision was given 
there was some confusion as to the ratio decidendi of the 
case. Lord Wilberforce, delivering the advice of the Privy 
Council in Frazer v Walker explained the difficulty in these 
words: (220) 
In each appeal their Lordships decided that registration 
was conclusive to confer upon the appellants a title 
unimpeachable by the respondents. The facts involved in 
each of the appeals were complicated and not identical one 
with another, a circumstance which has given rise to some 
difference of opinion as to the precise ratio decidendi -
the main relevant difference being whether the decision 
established the indefeasibility of title of a registered 
proprietor who acquired his interest under a void 
instrument, or whether it is only a bona f ide purchaser 
from such a proprietor whose title is indefeasible. 
This confusion was clarified in Frazer v Walker where the 
Judicial Committee came to the same substantive conclusion as 
the Court of Appeal though it elected to do so by very 
different means. Their Lordships pronounced in favour of 
immediate indefeasibility by declaring that registration of 
an instrument which is forged, or which is void for any other 
reason, is effective to vest and to divest title and to 
protect the registered proprietor against adverse claims. 
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The two cases of considerable importance to New 
Zealand land law are therefore Assets Co. Ltd. and Frazer 
v Walker. While these two have had a substantial impact, 
the limited number of important cases considered by the 
Board may be the subject of some speculation. However, 
this can probably be explained by the similarities between 
the New Zealand and the Australian Torrens system, 
which has resulted in decisions in one jurisdiction 
commonly being applied in the other. The Judicial 
Committee's direct influence on New Zealand land law is 
thus limited to two decisions of significance. 
Family Law 
Six appeals proceeded to the Judicial Committee on 
issues of family law. Of these, three were allowed{50%). 
Wasteneys v Wasteneys { 2 21) concerned the validity of a 
separation deed. The Board took a different view of the 
evidence from the New Zealand courts and held that as 
there was no evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation 
there were no grounds to set the deed aside. 
Dillon v Public Trustee{222) was an important case, as 
it held that the Family Protection Act 1908 took 
precedence over the interest of a beneficiary under the 
will even where the interest was backed by a contract for 
valuable consideration to make the will in that form. 
While this is a matter of considerable importance, it has 
subsequently not been given effect to by the courts.(223) 
Haldane v Haldane{224) involved the division of 
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matrimonial property subsequent to the Matrimonial Property 
Amendment Act 1963. However, this case was one of the last 
to be heard under that Act as it was replaced by the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 in the same year that Haldane 
was before the Judicial Committee. Because of the major 
differences between the enactments, Haldane has not generally 
affected the division of matrimonial property. 
Consequently, it is apparent that despite the 
high "success" rate, the Judicial Committee has not directly 
affected the development of family law in New Zealand. 
Practice and Procedure 
The majority of the cases classified in this category are 
applications to the Judicial Committee for leave to appeal. 
Leave was refused in ten cases. Interestingly, six petitions 
for special leave to appeal from criminal convictions have 
been declined since 1974. As noted earlier(225) the Board 
has heard relatively more criminal cases recently than it did 
in the early days of the right of appeal. However, this 
appears to be due more to increased demand than a new 
willingness by their Lordships• to hear such cases. 
In Barker v Edger ( 226) the Board considered whether the 
plaintiff was entitled to a rehearing before the Native Land 
Court. Their Lordships believed the language of the Poututu 
Jurisdiction Act 1889 was clear and that the Court did have 
jurisdiction to rehear the case. However, the future effect 
the case may have had was halted by legislative interference. 
In Benson v Kwong Chong(227) the Judicial Committee held 
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that the Court of Appeal was not entitled to set aside the 
findings of the jury who are the final arbiters of the facts 
in controversy between the parties. Judgment was therefore 
restored to the appellants as the jury had indicated. 
Obviously, the Board's influence in the area of Practice 
and Procedure can only be described as minimal. 
"Other" 
Due to the amorphous nature of this category it is evident 
that the Judicial Committee cannot have significantly 
affected "it". However, the appeals which were allowed will 
nonetheless be considered to measure any individual effect 
they may have had. 
In Clouston and Co. Ltd. v Corry (228) the Judicial 
Committee held that Rule 5 of the Court of Appeal Rules 
to the evident enabled judgment to be 
justice of the case. 
sought the exercise of 
entered according 
However, as the appellant had not 
such powers in the Court of Appeal 
they were not exercised: instead a new trial was directed. 
In A.Hatrick and Co. Ltd. v The King(229) the Board held 
that the Minister was not empowered to exact the dues and 
charges which he claimed under the authority of the 
Government Railways Act 1908. The other appeal allowed by 
the Judicial Committee was Brooker v Thomas Borthwick & 
Sons(Australia) Ltd. (230) in which the Board held that 
employees who had been working and were injured in the Napier 
earthquake were entitled to compensation under the provisions 
of the Workers Compensation Act. 
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None of the appeals which the Board allowed in this 
category are of general significance to the law. 
The analysis of the appeals which the board has heard and 
their subsequent effect has largely been limited to the cases 
which were al lowed on appeal. While this does not take 
account of some of the wide-ranging obiter dicta which were 
announced, nor some cases in which the appeal was dismissed 
upon grounds other than those relied upon in the Court of 
Appeal, it is nonetheless the most effective means of 
determining the influence the Judicial Committee has wielded 
on the law of New Zealand. This results from the fact that 
to assess the Board's effect, recourse must be had to 
conclusive data. 
obiter dicta 
Subsequent explanations of what the Board's 
was cannot be measured in such a way. 
Consequently, while recognising that an analysis of appeals 
which the Board has allowed may not give the most complete 
epitaph, it does give the most accurate and defensible one. 
The foregoing study of the appeals allowed from New 
Zealand by the Judicial Committee suggests that in reality 
the Board has not played a large role in the development of 
the law of New Zealand. The general areas where the Board's 
effect has been directly felt are the law of contract, the 
protection of Maori rights and the law of taxation. Apart 
from these areas the only notable cases are Lesa v Attorney-
General, (231) Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd, (232) and 
Frazer v Walker. ( 233) It can therefore be said that the 
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Judicial Committee has not historically had a large 
impact upon the law of New Zealand. However, this must be 
read subject to the Board's influence in this last decade. 
While it is difficult to assess the future effect cases such 
as Rowling and O'Connor v Hart(234) will have, because they 
were decided so recently, they have the potential to 
constitute a considerable impact upon New Zealand Law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident that New Zealand is soon to abolish the 
appeal to the Privy Council. Such action is to be welcomed 
as an analysis of the grounds for keeping the appeal shows 
that its retention cannot be justified. 
An examination of the appeals which the Judicial Committee 
has allowed leads to the conclusion that the Board has not 
directly played a large role in the development of the law of 
New Zealand. However, the Board has had an ongoing influence 
in the areas of the law of contract and taxation . It also 
gave important contributions to the protection of Maori 
rights in the early days of the colony. While the 
significance of the Board has generally not been notable this 
is not due to a decline in either its use or effect. Instead 
it appears that the Board has been reasonably constant and 
there has not subsequently been any drop off in either the 
success rate or the influence of its decisions over time. 
The Judicial Committee has exerted the greatest influence 
over New Zealand law through indirect means . This includes 
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matters such as the ability and the desire of the local 
courts to develop a distinct New Zealand law. Obviously it is 
a matter which is affected by many variables such as the 
extent to which the judiciary retain colonial attitudes, the 
position of the Court of Appeal on the issue of stare 
decisis, the emphasis placed upon a uniform Commonwealth law 
by the Board and differing approaches taken by the judiciary. 
Unfortunately, these factors do not lend themselves to 
concrete analysis. There is also a difficulty in 
distinguishing to what extent they relate directly to the 
Privy Council's influence as distinguished from the more 
general English influence which is to be expected. While it 
is recognised that these factors have played a large part in 
the Judicial Committee's influence on the development of New 
Zealand law, it is apparent that because of their nature they 
have diminished in importance over time. Consequently even 
the Board's indirect influence can now be seen to be 
insubstantial. 
Theoretically, the loss of the appeal to the Privy Council 
is of much importance. Realistically, however, the Board's 
absence will be a matter of little consequence. 
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